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           A COMMENT UPON THE ROLE OF 
             THE JUDICIARY IN JAPAN* 
                     Shigenori Matsui ** 
                            INTRODUCTION
   The judiciary has only a recent history here in Japan. In its modern 
sense, the judiciary was first set up by the first modem constitution of 
Japan, the Meiji Constitution of 1889. Yet the system of govemment 
under the Meiji Constitution was a constitutional monarchy. The judiciary 
was thus supposed to exercise judicial power only in the narre of the 
Emperor, and no full independence of the judiciary was guaranteed. It 
didn't even have jurisdiction over administrative cases (lawsuits attacking 
the exercise of govemmental power), which exclusively belonged to the 
special Administrative Court. The constitutional guarantee of rights was 
subject to any legislative restrictions, and the judiciary did not have power 
to review the constitutionality of legislative acts. In contrast, the Japanese 
Constitution of 1946, based on the republican separation of powers 
principle, separated judicial power from legislative and executive powers 
and assigned it to the judiciary. Moreover, the judiciary under the Japanese 
Constitution is guaranteed full independence and has jurisdiction over all 
legal disputes. And finally, the Japanese Constitution guarantees a full range 
of fundamental rights even against the Diet, and grants the judiciary the 
power of judicial review. The judiciary is authorized thereby to invalidate 
legislation and other govemmental actions deemed to violate the Constitu-
tion. 
  Apparently, therefore, the judiciary under the Japanese Constitution is 
    * This paper was submitted at the Specialists Conference of the Kyoto American Studies 
Summer Seminar, held in Kyoto, Japan, in summer of 1987. I would like to thank Professor L. Karst, 
U.C.L.A. School of Law, and other participants of the Seminar as well as two visiting professors of my 
faculty, Mr. Richard B. Parker and Professor Dan Rosen, for their helpful comments and editorial 
help. AR the responsibilities are mine. 
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expected to play a far more extended role . What role then has the Japanese 
judiciary played in its forty years of history? And what role can and should 
the judiciary play in the Japanese society? These are the questions I would 
like to address in this paper 1 
                  A GUARDIAN OFTHE CONSTITUTION? 
   In Japan it is widely assumed among commentators that the principal 
roles of the judiciary are to guarantee the Constitution against any encroach-
ment and to protect individual rights. Equipped with the power of judicial 
review similar to that exercised by American courts, the Japanese judiciary is 
authorized to strike down laws and other governmental ctions repugnant to 
the Constitution. It is thereby expected to assure that no branch of 
govemment transgresses granted authorities and invades fundamental rights 
of the people guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court has become, as is 
often called, a guardian of the Constitution. 
   Nevertheless, o far, the Japanese judiciary, especially the Japanese 
Supreme Court, has not exercised its judicial power up to the expectation of 
these commentators. The Japanese judiciary, it is often claimed, is 
committed to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint, almost to the point 
of self-abdication of the power of judicial review itself. There are two 
reasons for this claim. 
   First, the Court is very demanding in its threshold requirements. As to 
the standing requirement, he Court does not find standing unless a plaintiff 
can show some "legally protected interests" under the relevant specific 
statutes? Even though a statute may be construed to offer legal protection 
to a plaintiff, the Court often has refused to find such an interest, claiming 
that the plaintiff's alleged interest is merely a de facto expectation 3 More 
striking is the Court's use of the "political question" doctrine. When a case 
    1. For the Japanese judicial system and judicial dministration in general, see Hattori, TheRole 
of the Supreme Court of Japan in the Field of Judicial Administration, 60 WASH. L. REV. 69 (1984). 
    2. The judgment of April 8, 1982, Supreme Court, lst petty bench, Minshuu vol. 36, no. 4, at. 
594 (the Textbook Censorship Case); the judgment of Sept. 9,1982, Supreme Court, lst petty bench, 
Minshuu vol. 36, no. 9, at 1679 (the Naganuma Case); the judgment of Dec. 17, 1985, Supreme Court, 
3rd petty bench, Hanreijihou v l.1179, at 56 (the Date Power Plant Case). 
    3. A rare xception s the judgment of Jan. 19, 1962, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Minshuu 
vol. 16, no. 1, at 57, where the Court admitted standing of a plaintiff, a public bath owner, to 
challenge th governmental grant of permission t  new public bath construction in violation f one of 
the permission tandards, the required distance from the existing facilities.
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raises a highly political question which implicates fundamental governmental 
policy choices, the Court has refused to intervene unless the challenged 
governmental action unquestionably violates the Constitution. For example, 
even though the existence of American military force in Japan based on the 
Japan-United States Mutual Security Treaty was challenged as violating the 
Constitution (Art. 9), the Court refused to pass upon the constitutional issue 
by invoking this "political question" doctrine? 
   Secondly, the Court has been very deferential to the judgment of the 
Diet. In its forty years of history, only in a handful of cases has the Court 
struck down legislative actions as unconstitutional. One of them was a 
confiscation case, and it involved rather a procedural issue. When the 
government confiscated the clothes which were unsuccessfully shipped 
to Korea for smuggling without notice and hearing to their owner, the Court 
found that the confiscation violated Article 29 (property right) and Article 
31 (no deprivation of life or liberty and no other criminal penalty except 
according to procedure established by law) 5 Another case was a parricide 
case. The Criminal Code imposed severer penalty on parricides as compared 
to ordinary milyders, and the Court found the différence unreasonable and 
declared the provision to be répugnant to Article 14 (right to equality)6 
Two other cases concerned economic regulation. When the Pharmaceutical 
Act demanded that a new pharmacy store keep a certain distance from 
already established stores, the Court concluded that this restriction on the 
right to choose one's occupation, protected by Article 22, Section 1, could 
not be held as necessary or as reasonable.' And the Court found the 
    4. The judgment of Dec. 16, 1959, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishuu vol. 13, no. 13,at 
3225 (the Sunagawa case). Although t e existence of the Self Defence Force also implicates anissue 
of Article 9 violation, a number oflower courts have refused todecide upon its constitutionality by 
appealing to this doctrine. The judgment of Aug. 5, 1976, Sapporo High Court, Gyoushuu vol. 27, 
no. 8, at 1175 (the Naganuma C se); the judgment of July 7, 1981, Nagoya District Court, Hanrei-
jihou vol. 1003, at 3. 
    5. The judgment of Nov. 28, 1962, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishuu vol. 16, no. 11, at 
1593. 
    6. The judgment of April 4, 1973, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishuu vol. 27, no. 3, at 265. 
The Criminal Code imposed the death penalty or 3 year to life imprisonment for ordinary murders 
while it imposed the death penalty or life imprisonment for parricides, with no hope for probation. 
The defendant, raped by her father and having been forced to live with him, killed her father because 
he strongly opposed toher marriage when she fell in love with another man. The Court struck down 
the criminal parricide provision because it inflicted an unreasonably severe p nalty on the defendant. 
Some concurring Judges intimated that it was impermissible in the first place to treat parricide 
differently from ordinary murders. 
    7. The judgment ofApril 30, 1975, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshuu vol. 29, no. 4, at 572. 
The Pharmaceutical Act set up a license system for opening a new pharmacy store. One of the
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restriction in the Forest Act on a division claim by the joint-owner of the 
forest unconstitutionally unreasonable s
   In no case involving freedom of expression, religious freedom, or other 
political freedoms, however, has the Court invalidated challenged govern-
mental actions. In early days, when these statutes were challenged, the 
Court, having stated that constitutional protection of freedom was not 
absolute and that it must yield to governmental restrictions to protect 
general welfare, jumped into conclusions that the governmental restrictions 
were not unconstitutional, without even inquiring whether the restrictions 
were indeed necessary to accomplish some compelling state interests. The 
Court simply deferred to the judgment of the Diet 9 Although in recent days 
the Court has corne to utilize the interest balancing test and to inquire 
into the governmental objective and necessity of abridgment, the results have 
been the saure, i.e., in favor of the government.1° The only cases wherein the 
Court intervened into the political sphere are the reapportionment cases. 
Faced with gross disproportionality of apportionment, some electors in the 
underrepresented istricts filed a suit attacking the election claiming that the 
underlying apportionment statute was an unconstitutional violation of the 
command of equality, before the law (Art. 14). The Court agreed. Never-
theless, it refused to vacate the election, even though it declared the under-
lying apportionment statute to be unconstitutional I' 
required conditions for a license was proper distance from existing stores. The Court upheld the 
license requirement. Yet it thought that the distance ondition was not substantially related to nor 
necessary to its legislative purpose, i.e. protection f public health from the possible danger resulting 
from the excessive competition. 
    8. The judgment of April 22, 1987, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshuu vol. 41, no. 3, at 408. 
The plaintiff and the defendant were given the forest involved by their father. Normally, the Civil 
Code allows adivision daim by one of the joint-owners. Yet section 186 of the Forest Act prohibited 
such a daim if the claimant had no more than half the share, apparently for the purpose ofstabilizing 
the forest management by preventing the balkanization of the forest. The Court hought that this 
restriction  the property right did not contribute oits legislative purpose and held it to be un-
reasonable and unnecessary. 
    9. See, e.g., the judgment of May 18, 1949, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishuu vol. 3, no. 6, 
at 839 (advocacy of illegal action); the judgment of March 13, 1957, Supreme Court, grand bench, 
Keishuu vol. 11, no. 3, at 997 (obscenity); the judgment of July 20, 1960, Supreme Court, grand 
bench, Keishuu vol. 14, no. 9, at 1243 (demonstration). See L. BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
IN JAPAN 152 (1984). 
   10. The judgment of June 15, 1981, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishuu vol. 35, no. 4, at 
205 (prohibition f door to door canvasing forelection campaign); thejudgment of Dec. 12, 1984, 
Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshuu vol. 38, no. 12, at 1308 (censorship on imported publication). 
For an overview of nome of the recent court decisions, see Beer, Japan's Constitutional System and Its 
Judiciallnterpretation, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 7, 21-40 (1984).
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               LEGITIMIZING THE CGOVERNMENTAL ACTION? 
   Some commentators even claim that the Court is now playing a major 
role not in enforcing constitutional provisions against the government but 
in legitimizing governmental actions when they are challenged by the 
citizens. The basis for this claim is that the Court, in more than once, went 
on to uphold the constitutionality of governmental actions even though it 
found cases to be unjusticiable. When a labor union challenged govern-
mental refusai to permit a May Day public meeting at the exterior garden of 
the Emperor's Palace, for instance, the Court held that the case became 
moot because the May Day had passed and plaintiffs had no longer any 
legal interests for challenging the governmental action. Yet the Court 
went on to uphold the constitutionality of the permit refusa112 The Court, 
it is thus said, is not reluctant to intervene but is rather very eager to 
intervene in order to legitimize govemmental actions. 
                 A GUARDIAN OF PROPERTYRIGHTS? 
   On the other hand, it may be said that the Japanese Supreme Court has 
now become a guardian of property rights. For while deferring to the 
judgment of the Deit in reviewing restrictions on political freedoms, it has 
employed somewhat strict scrutiny to invalidate economic regulations. 
   Indeed, in its recent decisions on property rights, the Court has developed 
a bifurcated analysis: strict scrutiny for "preventive" police power restric-
tions and minimal scrutiny for "affirmative" social welfare legislations. Thus 
when a statute abridges property rights in order to protect the public safety 
and health, the Court demands that the statute is substantially related to 
sonie important state interests 13 On the other hand, when a statute 
   11. The judgment of April 14, 1976, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshuu vol. 30, no.3, at 223. 
See Matsui, The Reapportionment Cases in Japan: Constitutional L w, Politics, and the Japanese 
Supreme Court, 33 OSAKAU.L. REV. 17 (1986). 
   12. The judgment of Dec. 23, 1953, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshuu vol. 7, no. 13, at 
1561. See also the judgment of May 24, 1967, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshuu vol. 21, no. 5, 
at 1043 (the Asahi Case), wherein the Court concluded that the case became moot because of the 
death of the plaintiff but it went on to reject the plaintiff's claim that he welfare payment provided 
by the government was insufficient to meet the constitutional m ndate of Article 25. 
   13. The judgment of April 30, 1975, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshuu vol. 29, no. 4, at 572 
(the Pharmaceutical A t Case).
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abridges property rights to promote social welfare, to preserve the good 
functioning of the economy, or to protect socially vulnerable people, the 
Court simply defers to the Diet and does not overturn the statute unless it 
violates the Constitution without doubt 14 The Court's willingness to 
employ strict scrutiny in reviewing economic regulation is striking, for it has 
never employed such scrutiny when reviewing statutes restricting freedom 
of speech. 
   This Court's solicitude toward economic freedoms is ironic, as many 
commentators have argued that the Court should employ strict scrutiny 
when reviewing restrictions on freedom of speech while it should defer to 
the Deit when reviewing economic regulations. Although the Court 
implied that this double standard does apply, it has never actually applied 
it in cases involving personal freedom. And in reality, as noted above, the 
Court has employed strict scrutiny only when reviewing economic regula-
tions. Apparently, the Court seems to be more willing to interfère with the 
Diet's judgment when its decision does not have significant political implica-
tions. 
                   THE COURT'S POSTURE EXPLAINED 
  Why the Japanese judiciary is so unwilling to interfère with the govern-
mental actions when citizens challenge them? Why are they so reluctant to 
protect rights of individuals, especially political freedoms? Why are they 
somewhat receptive to claims of property right infringement? Why are they 
so willing on the other hand to intervene to uphold challenged governmental 
actions? There are several possible explanations. 
  The first explanation is political. The reluctance of the Court to exercise 
the power of judicial review, according to this explanation, is simply a 
manifestation of the political ideology of Supreme Court Judges. According 
to the Constitution, the Chief Judge is appointed by the Emperor upon the 
designation by the Cabinet (Art. 6 II) and other Judges are appointed by 
the Cabinet (Art. 79). Even though the candidates have to meet statutory 
qualifications, otherwise the appointment is wholly discretionary, subject 
   14. The judgment of Nov. 22, 1972, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishuu vol. 26, no.9, at 586 
(the Retail Store Protection Act Case). But see the judgment ofApril 22, 1987, Supreme Court, 
grand bench, Minshuu vol. 41, no. 3, at 408 (the Forest Act Case), where the Court invalidated the 
restriction property right without making clear which standard did apply.
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only to dismissal by the public review, winch has never been an effective 
control on the Cabinet's appointment power. Since the conservative parties 
have occupied the Cabinet for a long time, Judges-except first appointees 
-are all appointed by the conservative Cabinets. When we consider the 
unlikelihood that the ruling conservative party (now the Liberal Democratic 
Party) will appoint persons unfavorable to its political vision to the Supreme 
Court, it is only natural that the Supreme Court is deferential to the Diet 
and the Executive 15 Even the willingness of the Court to legitimize govern-
mental actions when they are challenged by citizens may then appear as 
natural. It is only when the invalidation does not cause significant political 
embarrassment o the Cabinet and the ruling party that the Court is rela-
tively at ease to exercise judicial power. That is why the Court has 
invalidated statutes only when they infringed property rights. 
   The second explanation views the Court's posture as tactical. The 
reluctance of the Court, according to this view, is only a strategy of the 
Court to solidify the prestige of the judiciary. The United States Supreme 
Court did not exercise its power so strikingly during its early years. It had 
to solidify its prestige in order to exercise its power safely and confidently. 
Only after its power came to be widely accepted that it came to strike down 
legislation as unconstitutional. Upon comparison, the Japanese Supreme 
Court has only forty years of experience. It is thus too early, according to 
this explanation, for the Japanese Court to claim its power, especially in 
areas having political implications. 
   One can also point out the institutional limits as well. For the statutory 
scheme for a suit against administrative actions, the mort typical suit 
involved in constitutional litigation, sets hardly surmontable obstacles to 
effective judicial relief. First, as to threshold requirements, the Administra-
tive Cases Litigation Act, which sets forth the court procedure in cases 
against administrative agencies, grants standing only to those who have 
"legally protected interests" in disputes (Sec. 9). Unlike Americans who 
can go to the court only upon showing injury in fact under the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act, the Japanese plaintiff who wants to challenge 
a governmental action must show that his or her alleged interest is somehow 
protected by the specific statutes. Moreover, the Act assumes the action for 
   15. For a study of judicial philosophies of ome of the Supreme Court Judges, ee Urata,The 
Judicial Review System in Japan -Legal Ideology of the Supreme Court Judges, 3 WASEDA 
BULLETIN OF COMPARATIVE LAW 16 (1983).
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judicial revocation as a principal form of action against govemmental actions 
(Sec. 3). In other words, as far as the exercice of governmental power by the 
administrative agency is concerned, the court only has jurisdiction for a 
revocation action. There is no provision for an injunction. It has been 
rather thought that an injunction against adminsitrative agencies violates the 
separation of powers principle. Moreover, the suit must be filed attacking 
the administrative "disposition," i.e., the final order of the agency. And the 
filing of a suit against the governmental action does not prevent the govern-
ment from exercising its power (Sec. 25). Even though the court is 
authorized to grant stay against governmental actions, the requirements are 
strict and the stay may be nullified by the Prime Minister (Sec. 27). And, 
finally when the revocation of the challenged administrative action would 
produce highly undesirable consequences, the court is authorized not to 
revoke that action even if the court found it to be illegal (Sec. 31)16 Under 
such a statutory scheme, the citizen plaintiff is extremely hard-pressed to 
have the court revoke any governmental actions. And the judiciary is 
extremely reluctant to go beyond statutory authorizations. 
       THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONSCIOUSNESS 
   There are some plausibility as well as limits to each explanation. But is 
there anything special about the Japanese society for this reluctance of the 
judiciary? Is it somehow a natural result of the lgal consciousness of the 
Japanese people? I' 
   The Japanesesociety is often said to be a groupist society of homogene-
ous people. And the Japanese are said to respect harmony and to dislike 
self-assertions or personal confrontations, thus avoiding a resort to the court 
for solving the disputes 18 It may be then possible to say that the Court's 
   16. For the administrative case litigation procedure in general, see Tanakadate, A Summary of the 
Limitations on Administrative Adjudication u der the Japanese Constitution, 18LAW IN JAPAN 
108, 110-11 (1986); Dziubla, The Impotent Sword of Japanese Justice: The Doctrine ofShobunsei 
as a Barrier to Administrative Litigation, 18 CORN. INT'L L.J. 37 (1985). 
   17. For the significance of "legal consciousness" for comparative study, see. e.g., Yasaki, Signifi-
cance of "Legal Consciousness" in Regard to Social Facts and Social Institutions, 31OSAKA U. L. 
REV. 1 (1984). But see Miyazawa, Taking Kawashima Seriously: A Review of Japanese R search on
Japanese Legal Consciousness andDisputing Behavior, 21 LAW & SOCIETY REv. 219 (1987) 
(arguing for the necessity of behavioral analysis). 
   18. See, e.g. L. BEER, supra note 9, at 101-15 ("individual groupism"). See also Wagatsun.a & 
Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & 
SOCIETY REv. 461 (1986). Some commentators disagree and insist hat he number of litigations 
and lawyers i not small in Japan and that the Japanese are litigious. See Haley, The Myth of the 
Reluctant Litigant and the Role of the Judiciary in Japan, 4:2 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 350 (1978);
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unwillingness to overturn the Diet's act may be regarded as not astonishing 
in light of these characteristics of the Japanese society. It is natural for the 
Japanese judges that they prefer not to disturb the judgment of other 
branches of the government. On the other hand, Professor Haley points out 
that the lack of law enforcement and a remarkable freedom from legal 
restraints are the most prominent characteristics of the Japanese society 19 
Law, including the Constitution, serves as mere tatemae (guiding principle to 
be respected) and the actual behaviors of the people are determined by other 
social controls. It is not then surprising that the Constitution is not an 
effective constraint on the government. The constitution serves rather as a 
symbol and, viewed in this light, it may be serving its role without active 
judicial implementation. Even though most constitutional law scholars are 
highly critical of the Court's insufficient zealousness to protect fundamental 
rights, it may be argued that the fundamental rights are well protected in 
Japan by other governmental institutions and by non-legal sanctions?° 
   Or it may even be argued that the very concepts of individual and indi-
vidual rights essential to the Western idea of constitutionalism is lacking in 
the Japanese society 21 The role of the language and the yole of the sacred 
scripture so characteristic to the Western constitutionalism may be foreign to 
the Japanese society. Professor Parker, for instance, says that the Constitu-
tion and the individual rights play an indispensable role in the United States 
because Americans have no cultural traditions in common. The Constitu-
tion, he says, is the sacred scripture embodying the universal moral 
principles, and the American insistence on individual rights and personal 
freedom arises from the need to follow the commands of God. This, he says, 
is the unique characteristic of the American society and of the United States 
Constitution. Professor Parker thereby implies that, here in Japan, lacking 
such a characteristic, the Constitution cannot play the similar role and that 
Haley, The Role of Law in Japan: An Historical Perspective, 18 KOBE U.L. REv. 1 (1984); Galanter, 
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Dont Know (And Think We Know) About 
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 4 (1983). Professor Tanaka 
argues that both views are overgeneralizations and that Japan should be regarded as in a transitory 
stage from the traditional society to the modern Western society. Tanaka, The Role of Law in 
Japanese Society: Comparisons with the West, 19 U.B.C. L. REv. 2 (1985). 
   19. Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law without Sanctions, 8: 2 J. 
JAPANESE ; STUDIES 265; Haley,Introduction: Legal vs. Social Controls, 17 LAw IN JAPAN 1 (1984). 
   20. See Beer, supra note 10, at 21. 
   21. For a difference oncerning the idea of the self in Japanese and Western society, sec J. Smith, 
Ajase and Oedipus: Ideas of the Self in Japanese and Western Legal Consciousness, 20 U.B.C. L. REv. 
341 (1986) [also reprinted on 34 OSAKA U.L. REv. 1 (1987)] .
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     constitutional guarantees *of individual rights can never be fully realizedin 
     Japan22 Perhaps we should not expect the Japanese judiciary to perform 
     the same role the United States courts have played thus far. 
        If these characterizations of the Japanese society andlegal consciousness 
     are correct, then two différent views on the role of the judiciary appear to 
     follow. On the one hand, one view would say that it is meaninglessto
     expect the Japanese judiciary to intervene to protect fundamental rights of 
     people. For the Japanese judiciary is simply playing its expected role of
     preserving harmony and order in the society. Japanese commentators are
     then simply expecting too much from the Japanese judiciary. On the other 
     hand, the opposing view would say that the judicial protection of mino-
     rity rights are all the more pressing, because the judiciary is the only 
     organ which can protect vulnerable minorities in the Japanese society. 
     Surely the court have to face great difficulties, for it has to protect 
     minorities in a society which is not receptive to such minorities, and with no 
     help either from the support of general public or from the scriptual 
     authority of the Constitution. Nevertheless, if the rights of insular and 
     discrete monorities are to be protected, there is no place other than the 
     judiciary that could perform that task in Japan. 
        How could the Japanese judiciary perform this task? Recently Pro-
     fessor Ikeda argues that the traditional Japanese society has a unique 
     notion of individual within the society. It is a Buddhist notion of 
     "ichimiwagou" (everyone in harmony)
, an insistence on harmony by dedica-
     tion of self to the society. The Western notions of right and individual, he 
     claims, are alien to this Japanese society. Nevertheless, these unique
     Japanese notions, he implies, may provide a clue to find a way for the 
     judiciary to protect rights of people in the Japanese Society23 
                         NEW CHALLENGE FOR THE COURT
        Yet even Professor Ikeda's account seemsto provide no immediate 
          22. Parker, The Authority of Law in the United States and in Japan, 33 OSAKAU.L.REV. 1 
       (1986); Parker, Law and Language in Japan and in the United States, 34 OSAKA U.L. REV. 47 
       (1987); Parker, Some Reasons for the Extraordinary Authority Which the United States Constitution 
      Has for Americans (unpublished manuscript). 
          23. Ikeda, Kenpoushakaitaikei nitsuite (On the Social System of the Constitution), i  NIHON-
      KOKU KENPOU No RIRON 1 (1986); Ikeda, Gendai Nihon Shakai to Kenpou -Josetsu (Con-
       temporary Japanese Society and the Constitution -Preface), in 58: 6 HOURITSU. JIHOU 14 (1986).
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suggestions for the court to follow in modem Japanese society. For as a 
part of the growing tendency of urbanization and westernization, the 
Japanese society is rapidly changing. More and more people have corne to 
be dissatisfied with traditional Japanese way of life stressing harmony and 
self-dedication and to seek individualistic way of life. The judiciary •is now 
facing the difficult issues rising from this transition. 
   We can find one clear manifestationof such change in a growing number 
of assertions of new constitutional rights. Although the Japanese Constitu-
tion has an elaborate bill or rights, more elaborate than the United States 
Constitution, its enumeration of rights have never been perceived as 
exclusive. Yet rince its enumeration is relatively elaborate, there had been 
no serious inquiry into the source and limits of unenumerated constitutional 
rights. Recently, however, a growing number of citizens has corne to look 
to the Constitution as a basis for preventing pollutions and challenging tight 
social controls in private lives of the traditional Japanese society.. Since the 
Japanese Constitution does not contain specific provision for this kind of 
constitutional rights, commentators have started to invoke the concept of 
"life
, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" guaranteed by Art. 13 as a 
textual basis for such rights4 The environmental right, the right of 
privacy, the right to live in peace, and other countless new constitutional 
rights have been thus asserted before the court. 
   Thus far, however, the courts have not been receptive to these assertions 
of new constitutional rights. Although the Court has showed some 
willingness to accept an informational privacy right25 it has never embraced 
environmental right as a constitutional right. While it was argued that the 
criminal punishment of personal use of drags is unconstitutional s the use 
of drugs in itself is harmless, the Court rejected this argument noting that the 
use of drugs is not harmless26 And when it was claimed that a local 
ordinance punishing people who had sexual intercourse with boys and girls 
   24. Some commentators haveattempted to establish a right of privacy asdeveloped by theUnited 
States Supreme Court and commentators. See,e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 
YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
   25. The judgment of Dec. 24, 1969, Keishuu vol. 23, no. 12, at 1625. But see the judgment of 
Feb. 14, 1986, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishuu vol. 40, no. 1, at 48 (upholding thecon-
stitutionality of using an electronic device automatically t king a snap shot of a car and a driver 
when it detects speeding); the judgment of Aug. 25, 1986, Tokyo High Court, Hanreijihou v l.1208, 
at 66 (no invasion f privacy b alien registration requirement by finger print). 
   26. The judgment of Sept. 10, 1985, Supreme Court, lst pettybench, Hanreijihou v l.1165, at 
183.
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of no more than 18 years of age unconstitutionally invaded freedom of 
sexual intercourse, the Court didn't squarely answer the claim 27 Similarly 
when the public school hair grooming policy of requiring "monk head" to 
male students was challenged, nome commentators claimed it to be a uncon-
stitutional deprivation of freedom of hair length or personal appearance. 
Yet the lower court rejected the challenge?' 
   These cases apparently show the reluctance of the judiciary to expand 
the range of constitutionally protected rights29 Nevertheless, the fact that 
a growing number of citizens has corne to assert such new constitutional 
rights means that the Japanese people's attitude toward the Constitution 
is somewhat changing 30 And this new challenge for the Court evidently 
forces us to think about the proper role of the judiciary in the Japanese 
society. 
                             CONCLUSION 
  Although the Japanese Constitution has granted the judiciary with the 
power of judicial review, the judiciary has not exercised it up to the expecta-
tion of many commentators. There are several backgrounds for this extreme 
passivity of the Japanese judiciary in guaranteeing fundamental rights of 
people. The purpose of this Article is to analyse these backgrounds and to 
think over what role we can and should expect from the Japanese judiciary. 
Celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the Japanese Constitution, it is 
certainly an adequate time to reexamine what role the judiciary can and 
should play in the Japanese society under the Japanese Constitution. 
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